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MARKOV-NASH EQUILIBRIA IN MEAN-FIELD GAMES WITH
DISCOUNTED COST ∗
NACI SALDI, TAMER BAS¸AR, AND MAXIM RAGINSKY †
Abstract. In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with
a finite number N of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The
state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish space. At each time, the agents are coupled
through the empirical distribution of their states, which affects both the agents’ individual costs
and their state transition probabilities. We introduce a new solution concept of the Markov-Nash
equilibrium, under which a policy is player-by-player optimal in the class of all Markov policies.
Under mild assumptions, we demonstrate the existence of a mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-
population limit N → ∞, and then show that the policy obtained from the mean-field equilibrium
is approximately Markov-Nash when the number of agents N is sufficiently large.
Key words. Mean-field games, Nash equilibrium, discounted cost.
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1. Introduction. Mean-field game theory has been developed independently by
Huang, Malhame´, and Caines [25] and Lasry and Lions [29] to study continuous-
time non-cooperative differential games with a large number of identical agents. The
key underlying idea is that, under a particular equilibrium condition, called the Nash
certainty equivalence principle [25], the decentralized game problem can be reduced to
a single-agent decision problem. This principle essentially says that the state evolution
of an individual agent should be consistent with the total population behavior.
The optimal solution of this single-agent decision problem provides an approxi-
mation to Nash equilibria of games with large (but finite) population sizes. However,
in contrast to the standard single-agent optimal control problem, the characteriza-
tion of this optimal solution in the continuous-time setting leads to a Fokker-Planck
equation evolving forward in time, and a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolving
backward in time. We refer the reader to [24, 38, 23, 5, 12, 13, 17, 4, 34, 33] for studies
of continuous-time mean-field games with different models and cost functions, such
as games with major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, robust mean field games,
games with jump parameters, and LQG games.
By contrast, there are relatively few results on discrete-time mean-field games.
Existing works have mostly studied the setup where the state space is discrete (finite
or countable) and the agents are coupled only through their cost functions; that is,
the mean-field term does not affect the evolution of the states of the agents. Gomes
et al. [16] study a discrete-time mean-field game with a finite state space over a
finite horizon. Adlakha et al. [1] consider a discrete-time mean-field game where the
state space is a countable subset of a d-dimensional lattice, under an infinite-horizon
discounted cost criterion. This setup is the closest to the one studied here. However,
in addition to the state space being at most countable, Adlakha et al. [1] also assume
that, for each agent, every stationary policy induces a Markov chain that has at least
one invariant distribution. In this case, the optimal control problem in the mean-field
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limit corresponds to a standard homogeneous Markov decision problem. Biswas [9]
considers the average-cost setting, where the state space is a σ-compact Polish space
and the transition probability of an individual agent does not depend on the empirical
distribution of the states. Under the regularity conditions imposed in [9], it can be
shown that, for each stationary policy, the corresponding Markov process for each
agent has a unique invariant measure, which is a standard technique when studying
average-cost problems. However, these regularity conditions are stated in terms of a
specific metric topology on the set of stationary policies, and appear to be too strong
to hold under reasonable assumptions. Discrete-time mean-field games with linear
individual dynamics are studied in [15, 31, 35, 32].
In this paper, we consider discrete-time mean-field games with a Polish state
space, under the infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. In such a game,
the agents are coupled through the empirical distribution of their states at each time,
which affects both the individual costs and the state transition probabilities of each
agent. In Section 2 we formulate the finite-agent discrete-time game problem of
the mean-field type and introduce the solution concept of Markov-Nash equilibrium,
under which a policy is player-by-player optimal in the class of all Markov policies.
In Section 3, we introduce the infinite-population mean-field game and prove the
existence of a mean-field equilibrium, which we use in Section 4 to deduce the existence
of approximate Markov-Nash equilibria for N -agent games when N is sufficiently
large. In Section 5 we present an example to illustrate our results. Section 6 lists
some directions for future research. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
result demonstrating the existence of an (exact or approximate) equilibrium policy
for a general discrete-time mean-field game with finitely many agents.
Notation. For a metric space E, we let Cb(E) denote the set of all bounded continuous
real functions on E. Let P(E) denote the set of all Borel probability measures on E.
For any E-valued random element x, L(x)( · ) ∈ P(E) denotes the distribution of
x. A sequence {µn} of measures on E is said to converge weakly to a measure µ if∫
E
g(e)µn(de) →
∫
E
g(e)µ(de) for all g ∈ Cb(E). For any ν ∈ P(E) and measurable
real function g on E, we define ν(g) :=
∫
gdν. For any subset B of E, we let ∂B and
Bc denote the boundary and complement of B, respectively. The notation v ∼ ν
means that the random element v has distribution ν. For real numbers a and b, the
notation a ∨ b denotes the maximum of a and b. Unless otherwise specified, the term
“measurable” will refer to Borel measurability.
2. Finite Player Game with Discounted Cost. We consider a discrete-time
N -agent stochastic game with a Polish state space X and a Polish action space A.
The dynamics of the game are specified by an initial state distribution µ0 ∈ P(X) and
a stochastic state transition kernel p : X × A × P(X) → P(X) as follows. For every
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, let xNi (t) ∈ X and a
N
i (t) ∈ A denote the
state and the action of Agent i at time t, and let
e
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxN
i
(t)( · ) ∈ P(X)
denote the empirical distribution of the state configuration at time t, where δx ∈ P(X)
is the Dirac measure at x. The initial states xNi (0) are independent and identically
distributed according to µ0, and, for each t ≥ 0, the next-state configuration (xN1 (t+
2
1), . . . , xNN (t+ 1)) is generated at random according to the probability law
N∏
i=1
p
(
dxNi (t+ 1)
∣∣xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t ), (2.1)
where p( · |x, a, µ) denotes the image of the triple (x, a, µ) ∈ X × A × P(X) in P(X)
under the state transition kernel p.
To complete the description of the game dynamics, we must specify how the
agents select their actions at each time step. To that end, we introduce the history
spaces H0 = X × P(X) and Ht = (X × A × P(X))t × (X × P(X)) for t = 1, 2, . . ., all
endowed with product Borel σ-algebras.1 A policy for a generic agent is a sequence
π = {πt} of stochastic kernels on A given Ht; we say that such a policy is Markov if
each πt is a Markov kernel on A given X. The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted
by Πi, and the subset consisting of all Markov policies by Mi. Furthermore, we let
M
c
i denote the set of all Markov policies for Agent i that are weakly continuous; that
is, π = {πt} ∈ Mci if for all t ≥ 0, πt : X→ P(A) is continuous when P(A) is endowed
with the weak topology.
Let Π(N) =
∏N
i=1Πi, M
(N) =
∏N
i=1Mi, and M
(N,c) =
∏N
i=1M
c
i . We let pi
(N) :=
(π1, . . . , πN ), πi ∈ Πi denote the N -tuple of policies for all the agents in the game.
We will refer to pi(N) ∈ Π(N) simply as a ‘policy.’ Under such a policy, the action
configuration at each time t ≥ 0 is generated at random according to the probability
law
N∏
i=1
πit
(
daNi (t)
∣∣hNi (t)), (2.2)
where hNi (0) = (x
N
i (0), e
(N)
0 ) and h
N
i (t) = (h
N
i (t− 1), x
N
i (t), a
N
i (t− 1), e
(N)
t ) for t ≥ 1
are the histories observed by Agent i at each time step. When pi(N) ∈ M(N), Eq. (2.2)
becomes
N∏
i=1
πit(da
N
i (t)|x
N
i (t)).
The stochastic update rules in Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2), together with the initial state
distribution µ0, uniquely determine the probability law of all the states and actions
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all t ≥ 0. We will denote expectations with respect to this
probability law by Epi
(N)[
·
]
.
We now turn to the question of optimality. The one-stage cost function for a
generic agent is a measurable function c : X × A × P(X) → [0,∞). For Agent i,
the infinite-horizon discounted cost under the initial distribution µ0 and a policy
pi(N) ∈ Π(N) is given by
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) = Epi
(N)
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The standard notion of optimality is a player-
by-player one:
Definition 2.1. A policy pi(N∗) = (π1∗, . . . , πN∗) constitutes a Nash equilibrium
1We endow the set P(X) with the topology of weak convergence, which makes it a Polish space.
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if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , where pi
(N∗)
−i := (π
j∗)j 6=i.
There are two challenges pertaining to Nash equilibria in the class of games consid-
ered here. The first challenge is the (almost) decentralized nature of the information
structure of the problem. Namely, the agents have access only to their local state
information xNi (t) and the empirical distribution of the states e
(N)
t , and there is no
general theory (of existence and characterization of Nash equilibria) for such games
even with special structures for the transition probabilities. The second difficulty
arises because of the so-called curse of dimensionality; that is, the solution of the
problem becomes intractable when the number of states/actions and agents is large.
The existence of Nash equilibria in this case is a challenging problem even when the
agents have access to full state information {xNi (t)}
N
i=1 (see [26, 3, 30] and references
therein). Therefore, it is of interest to find an approximate decentralized equilibrium
with reduced complexity. To that end, we adopt the following solution concept:
Definition 2.2. A policy pi(N∗) ∈ M(N) is a Markov-Nash equilibrium if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Mi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , and an ε-Markov-Nash equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) ≤ inf
pii∈Mi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i) + ε
for each i = 1, . . . , N .
The main contribution of this paper is the proof of existence of ε-Markov-Nash
equilibria for games with sufficiently many agents. To this end, we first consider a
mean-field game that arises in the infinite-population limit N → ∞ and prove the
existence of an appropriately defined mean-field equilibrium for this limiting mean-
field game. Then we pass back to the finite-N case and show that, if each agent
in the original problem adopts the mean-field eqiulibrium policy, then the resulting
policy will be an approximate Markov-Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N .
It is important to note that, although the policy in the mean-field equilibrium is an
approximate Markov-Nash equilibrium for the finite-agent game problem, it is indeed
a true Nash equilibrium in the infinite population regime. This follows from the fact
that the set of Markov policies is sufficiently rich for optimality in the limiting case,
as each agent is faced with a single-agent decision problem.
2.1. Assumptions. In this section, we state all assumptions that will be made
on the game model for easy reference. They will be imposed when needed in the
remainder of the paper.
Let w : X → [1,∞) be a continuous moment function; that is, there exists an
increasing sequence of compact subsets {Kn}n≥1 of X such that
lim
n→∞
inf
x∈X\Kn
w(x) =∞.
We assume that w(x) ≥ 1 + dX(x, x0)p for some p ≥ 1 and x0 ∈ X, where dX is the
metric on X. In order to study bounded and unbounded one-stage cost functions c
4
simultaneously, we define the following function:
v :=
{
1, if c is bounded
w, if c is unbounded
For any g : X→ R, define the v-norm of g as
‖g‖v := sup
x∈X
|g(x)|
v(x)
.
Let Bv(X) denote the Banach space of all real valued measurable functions g on X
with finite v-norm and let Cv(X) denote the Banach space of all real valued continuous
functions in Bv(X).
Analogously, for any finite signed measure µ on X, let us define the v-norm of µ
as
‖µ‖v := sup
g∈Bv(X):
‖g‖v≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
g(x)µ(dx)
∣∣∣∣.
Note that if v = 1, then ‖µ‖v corresponds to the total variation distance [21, Section
7.2]. Let
Pv(X) :=
{
µ ∈ P(X) : ‖µ‖v <∞
}
=
{
µ ∈ P(X) :
∫
X
v(x)µ(dx) <∞
}
.
It is known that weak topology on P(X) can be metrized using the following metric:
ρ(µ, ν) :=
∞∑
m=1
2−(m+1)|µ(fm)− ν(fm)|,
where {fm}m≥1 is an appropriate sequence of continuous and bounded functions such
that ‖fm‖ ≤ 1 for all m ≥ 1 (see [36, Theorem 6.6, p. 47]). We define
ρv(µ, ν) := ρ(µ, ν) + |µ(v)− ν(v)|
which is a metric on Pv(X). Note that
ρv(µn, µ)→ 0⇐⇒ µn(g)→ µ(g), ∀g ∈ Cv(X).
Indeed, (⇐) is trivial. For (⇒), let ρv(µn, µ) → 0 which means that µn → µ weakly
and µn(v) → µ(v). Let g ∈ Cv(X). Define non-negative continuous function h as
h := ‖g‖vv + g. It is known that [20, Proposition E.2]
lim inf
n→∞
∫
X
h(x)µn(dx) ≥
∫
X
h(x)µ(dx).
But, since µn(v)→ µ(v), we should have
lim inf
n→∞
∫
X
g(x)µn(dx) ≥
∫
X
g(x)µ(dx).
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Conversely, define non-negative continuous function u as u := ‖g‖vv − g. Then, we
have
lim inf
n→∞
∫
X
u(x)µn(dx) ≥
∫
X
u(x)µ(dx).
But, since µn(v)→ µ(v), we should also have
lim sup
n→∞
∫
X
g(x)µn(dx) ≤
∫
X
g(x)µ(dx).
Thus, µn(g) → µ(g), which establishes the result. Let us call the topology induced
by metric ρv on Pv(X) as v-topology. It can be proved that Pv(X) with metric ρv is
a Polish space.
Suppose that v = w (i.e., c is unbounded). Define the Wasserstein distance of
order p ≥ 1 on Pv(X) as follows [39, Definition 6.1]:
Wp(µ, ν) := inf
{
E[dX(X,Y )
p]
1
p : L(X) = µ and L(Y ) = ν
}
.
Note that Wp is a metric on Pv(X) since v(x) ≥ 1 + dX(x, x0)p for all x ∈ X. Fur-
thermore, Wp(µn, µ) → 0 if and only if µn(g) → µ(g) for all continuous g with
|g(x)| ≤ 1+ dX(x, x0)p [39, Definition 6.8, Theorem 6.9]. The last observation implies
that the following metric βv(µ, ν) :=Wp(µ, ν) + |µ(v)− ν(v)| metrizes the v-topology
on Pv(X). Using the dual formulation of Wp [39, Theorem 5.10], we can write βv as
follows:
βv(µ, ν) = sup
(h,g)∈L1(µ)×L1(ν):
h(x)−g(y)≤dX(x,y)
p
|µ(h)− ν(g)|
1
p + |µ(v)− ν(v)|, (2.3)
where L1(λ) denotes the set of all λ-integrable real functions on X.
Remark 1. In the remainder of the paper, P(X) is always equipped with the
weak topology while Pv(X) is always equipped with the v-topology. In other words,
when we say that a function over Pv(X) is continuous, it should be understood that it
is continuous with respect to v-topology. Similarly, a function over P(X) is continuous
if it is continuous with respect to weak topology.
Assumption 1:
(a) The one-stage cost function c is continuous.
(b) A is compact and X is locally compact.
(c) There exists a non-negative real number α such that
sup
(a,µ)∈A×P(X)
∫
X
w(y)p(dy|x, a, µ) ≤ αw(x).
(d) The stochastic kernel p( · |x, a, µ) is weakly continuous; that is, if
(xn, an, µn) → (x, a, µ) in X × A × P(X), then p( · |xn, an, µn) → p( · |x, a, µ)
weakly. In addition, the function
∫
X
w(y)p(dy|x, a, µ) is continuous in (x, a, µ).
(e) The initial probability measure µ0 satisfies∫
X
v(x)µ0(dx) =:M <∞.
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Remark 2. Note that Assumption 1-(c) implies that the range of p lies in Pv(X);
that is,
{
p( · |x, a, µ) : (x, a, µ) ∈ X×A×P(X)
}
⊂ Pv(X). Therefore, Assumption 1-(d)
is equivalent to the following condition: if (xn, an, µn) → (x, a, µ) in X × A × P(X),
then p( · |xn, an, µn)→ p( · |x, a, µ) with respect to the v-topology on Pv(X).
For each t ≥ 0, let us define
Ptv(X) :=
{
µ ∈ Pv(X) :
∫
X
w(x)µ(dx) ≤ αtM
}
.
(f) There exist γ ≥ 1 and a non-negative real number R such that for each t ≥ 0,
if we define Mt := γ
tR, then
sup
(a,µ)∈A×Ptv(X)
c(x, a, µ) ≤Mtv(x).
(g) We assume that αβγ < 1.
Assumption 2:
Define the following moduli of continuity:
ωp(r) := sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
‖p( · |x, a, µ)− p( · |x, a, ν)‖v
ωc(r) := sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
|c(x, a, µ)− c(x, a, ν)|,
where ρ˜v = βv (see (2.3)) if c is unbounded, and ρ˜v = ρ if c is bounded.
For any function g : Pv(X)→ R, we define the v-norm of g as follows:
‖g‖∗v := sup
µ∈Pv(X)
|g(µ)|
µ(v)
.
(h) We assume that ωp(r) → 0 and ωc(r) → 0 as r → 0. Moreover, for any
µ ∈ Pv(X), the functions
ωp(ρ˜v( · , µ)) : Pv(X)→ R
and
ωc(ρ˜v( · , µ)) : Pv(X)→ R
have finite v-norm.
(i) There exists a non-negative real number B such that
sup
(a,µ)∈A×Pv(X)
∫
X
v2(y)p(dy|x, a, µ) ≤ Bv2(x).
Remark 3. Suppose that v = w. Define a metric λX on X as follows:
λX(x, y) :=
{
0, if x = y
v(x) + v(y), if x 6= y
7
For any real-valued measurable function g on X, define the Lipschitz seminorm of g
as:
‖g‖λ := sup
x 6=y
|g(x)− g(y)|
λX(x, y)
.
Let Lipλ(1,R) := {g : ‖g‖λ ≤ 1}. Then, for any µ, ν ∈ Pv(X), we have [19, Lemma
2.1]
‖µ− ν‖v = sup
g∈Lipλ(1,R)
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
g(x)µ(dx) −
∫
X
g(x)ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣. (2.4)
This alternative formulation of v-norm will be useful when verifying Assumption 2-(h)
for specific examples.
Remark 4. In the remainder of this paper, all the proofs are obtained under the
assumption that the cost function c is unbounded. The bounded case can be covered
by slight modification of the proofs for the unbounded case.
Before proceeding to the next section, we prove an important (but straightfor-
ward) result which will be used in the sequel. It basically states that there is no loss of
generality in restricting the infima in Def. 2.2 to weakly continuous Markov policies.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, for any policy pi(N) ∈ M(N),
we have
inf
pii∈Mi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i) = inf
pii∈Mc
i
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
3. Mean-field games and mean-field equilibria. We begin by considering a
mean-field game that can be interpreted as the infinite-population limit N → ∞ of
the game introduced in the preceding section. This mean-field game is specified by
the quintuple
(
X,A, p, c, µ0
)
, where, as before, X and A denote the state and action
spaces, respectively, p( · |x, a, µ) is the transition probability, and c is the one-stage
cost function. We also define the history spaces as G0 = X and Gt = (X × A)t × X
for t = 1, 2, . . ., which are endowed with their product Borel σ-algebras. A policy is
a sequence π = {πt} of stochastic kernels on A given Gt. The set of all policies is
denoted by Π. A Markov policy is a sequence π = {πt} of stochastic kernels on A
given X. The set of Markov policies is denoted by M.
Remark 5. It is important to note that mean-field games are not games in the
strict sense. As will be shown below, they are single-agent stochastic control problems
with a constraint on the distribution of the state at each time step.
In this section, we impose Assumption 1 on the components
(
X,A, p, c, µ0
)
of the
mean-field game model.
Instead of N agents in the original game, here we have a single agent and model
the collective behavior of (a large population of) other agents by an exogenous state-
measure flow µ := (µt)t≥0 ⊂ P(X) with a given initial condition µ0. We say that a
policy π∗ ∈ Π is optimal for µ if
Jµ(π
∗) = inf
pi∈Π
Jµ(π),
8
where
Jµ(π) := E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(x(t), a(t), µt)
]
is the infinite-horizon discounted cost of policy π with the measure flow µ. Here, the
evolution of the states and actions is given by
x(0) ∼ µ0,
x(t) ∼ p( · |x(t− 1), a(t− 1), µt−1), t = 1, 2, . . .
a(t) ∼ πt( · |g(t)), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where g(t) ∈ Gt is the state-action history up to time t.
Let M :=
{
µ ∈ P(X)∞ : µ0 is fixed
}
be the set of all state-measure flows with
a given initial condition µ0. Define the set-valued mapping Φ : M→ 2Π as Φ(µ) =
{π ∈ Π : π is optimal for µ}. Conversely, we define a mapping Λ : Π→M as follows:
given π ∈ Π, the state-measure flow µ := Λ(π) is constructed recursively as
µt+1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x(t), a(t), µt)P
pi(da(t)|x(t))µt(dx(t)),
where Ppi(da(t)|x(t)) denotes the conditional distribution of a(t) given x(t) under π
and (µτ )0≤τ≤t. Note that if π is a Markov policy (i.e., πt(da(t)|g(t)) = πt(da(t)|x(t))
for all t), then Ppi(da(t)|x(t)) = πt(da(t)|x(t)).
We are now in a position to introduce the notion of an equilibrium for the mean-
field game:
Definition 3.1. A pair (π,µ) ∈ Π×M is a mean-field equilibrium if π ∈ Φ(µ)
and µ = Λ(π).
The following structural result shows that the restriction to Markov policies entails
no loss of optimality:
Proposition 3.2. For any state measure flow µ ∈M, we have
inf
pi∈Π
Jµ(π) = inf
pi∈M
Jµ(π).
Furthermore, we have Λ(Π) = Λ(M); that is, for any π ∈ Π, there exists πˆ ∈ M such
that µpit = µ
pˆi
t for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.
In other words, we can restrict ourselves to Markov policies in the definitions of Φ and
Λ without loss of generality — that is, we have Φ(M) = 2M and Λ(M) = M. This
implies that, unlike the finite-population case, the policy in the mean-field equilibrium,
if it exists, constitutes a true Nash equilibrium of Markovian type for the infinite-
population game problem. Put differently, this policy is player-by-player optimal in
the class of all admissible (not only Markov) policies.
The main result of this section is the existence of a mean-field equilibrium under
Assumption 1.
Theorem 3.3. Under Assumption 1, the mean-field game (X,A, p, c, µ0) admits
a mean-field equilibrium (π,ν) ∈ M×M.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. For each t ≥ 0, let us define
Lt :=
∞∑
k=t
(βα)k−tMk,
9
where α andMk are constants defined in Assumption 1-(c) and (f), respectively. Note
that
Lt =Mt + (βα)Lt+1.
For each t ≥ 0, we define
Ctv(X) :=
{
u ∈ Cv(X) : ‖u‖v ≤ Lt
}
and
Ptv(X× A) :=
{
µ ∈ P(X× A) : µ1 ∈ P
t
v(X)
}
,
where for any ν ∈ P(X× A), ν1 denotes the marginal of ν on X; that is,
ν1( · ) := ν( · × A).
Moreover, we define
C :=
∞∏
t=0
Ctv(X)
Ξ :=
∞∏
t=0
Ptv(X × A).
We equip C with the following metric:
ρ(u,v) :=
∞∑
t=0
σ−t‖ut − vt‖v,
where σ > 0 is chosen so that σ > γ and σβα < 1. The first condition and Assump-
tion 1-(g) guarantee that ρ(u,v) <∞ for all u,v ∈ C. It can also be proved that C is
complete with respect to ρ.
For any ν ∈ Ξ and t ≥ 0, we define the operator T νt as
T νt u(x) = min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, νt,1) + β
∫
X
u(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
]
,
where u : X→ R.
Lemma 3.4. Let ν ∈ Ξ be arbitrary. Then, for all t ≥ 0, T νt maps C
t+1
v (X) into
Ctv(X). In addition, for any u, r ∈ C
t+1
v (X), we have
‖T νt u− T
ν
t r‖v ≤ αβ‖u− r‖v. (3.1)
Proof. Let u ∈ Ct+1v (X). By [6, Proposition 7.32], T
ν
t u is continuous. We also
have
‖T νt u‖v ≤ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
∣∣∣∣c(x, a, νt,1) + β ∫X u(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
∣∣∣∣
v(x)
≤ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
Mtv(x) + βαLt+1v(x)
v(x)
10
=Mt + βαLt+1 = Lt,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1-(c) and (f). This completes the
proof of the first statement. The proof of the second statement is straightforward, so
we omit the details.
Using operators {T νt }t≥0, let us define the operator T
ν : C → C as(
T νu
)
t
= T νt ut+1, for t ≥ 0. (3.2)
By Lemma 3.4, T ν is a well defined operator; that is, it maps C into itself.
Since T νt satisfies (3.1) for all t ≥ 0, it can be shown that T
ν is a contraction
operator on C with modulus σβα < 1. Hence, T ν has a unique fixed point by the
Banach fixed point theorem, as C is complete with respect to ρ.
For any ν ∈ Ξ, we let Jν∗,t : X → R denote the discounted-cost value function
at time t of the nonhomogeneous Markov decision process with the one-stage cost
functions
{
c(x, a, νt,1)
}
t≥0
and the transition probabilities
{
p( · |x, a, νt,1)
}
t≥0
. Under
Assumption 1, it can be proved that, for all t ≥ 0, Jν∗,t is continuous. Let J
ν
∗ :=(
Jν∗,t
)
t≥0
.
Lemma 3.5. For any ν ∈ Ξ, we have Jν∗ ∈ C.
Proof. Let π be arbitrary Markov policy. Note that for all t ≥ 0, we have
Jν∗,t(y) ≤
∞∑
k=t
βk−tEpi
[
c(x(k), a(k), νk,1)
∣∣x(t) = y]
≤
∞∑
k=t
βk−tMkE
pi
[
v(x(k))
∣∣x(t) = y] (by Assumption 1-(f))
≤
∞∑
k=t
βk−tMkα
k−tv(y) (by Assumption 1-(c))
= Ltv(y).
Hence, Jν∗,t ∈ C
t
v(X). This completes the proof.
The following theorem is a known result in the theory of nonhomogeneous Markov
decision processes (see [22, Theorems 14.4 and 17.1]).
Theorem 3.6. For any ν ∈ Ξ, the collection of value functions Jν∗ is the unique
fixed point of the operator T ν. Furthermore, π ∈ M is optimal if and only if
νpit
({
(x, a) : c(x, a, νt,1)+β
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
= T νt J
ν
∗,t+1(x)
})
= 1, (3.3)
where νpit = L
(
x(t), a(t)
)
under π and ν.
To prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium, we adopt the technique of Jovanovic
and Rosenthal [27]. Define the set-valued mapping Γ : Ξ→ 2P(X×A)
∞
as follows:
Γ(ν) = C(ν) ∩B(ν),
where
C(ν) :=
{
ν′ ∈ P(X× A)∞ : ν′0,1 = µ0 and
11
ν′t+1,1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, νt,1)νt(dx, da)
}
and
B(ν) :=
{
ν′ ∈ P(X× A)∞ : ∀t ≥ 0, ν′t
({
(x, a) : c(x, a, νt,1)
+ β
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1) = T
ν
t J
ν
∗,t+1(x)
})
= 1
}
.
The following proposition implies that the image of Ξ under Γ is contained in 2Ξ.
Proposition 3.7. For any ν ∈ Ξ, we have Γ(ν) ⊂ Ξ.
Proof. Fix any ν ∈ Ξ. It is sufficient to prove that C(ν) ⊂ Ξ. Let ν′ ∈ C(ν). We
prove by induction that ν′t,1 ∈ P
t
v(X) for all t ≥ 0. The claim trivially holds for t = 0
as ν′0,1 = µ0. Assume the claim holds for t and consider t+ 1. We have∫
X
w(y)ν′t+1,1(dy) =
∫
X×A
∫
X
w(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)νt(dx, da)
≤
∫
X
αw(x)νt,1(dx) (by Assumption 1-(c))
≤ αt+1M (as νt,1 ∈ P
t
v(X)).
Hence, ν′t+1,1 ∈ P
t+1
v (X). This completes the proof.
We say that ν ∈ Ξ is a fixed point of Γ if ν ∈ Γ(ν). The following proposition
makes the connection between mean-field equilibria and the fixed points of Γ.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose that Γ has a fixed point ν = (νt)t≥0. Construct a
Markov policy π = (πt)t≥0 by disintegrating each νt as νt(dx, da) = νt,1(dx)πt(da|x),
and let ν1 = (νt,1)t≥0. Then the pair (π,ν1) is a mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. If ν ∈ Γ(ν), then corresponding Markov policy π satisfies (3.3) for ν.
Therefore, by Theorem 3.6, π ∈ Φ(ν1). Moreover, since ν ∈ C(ν), we have Λ(π) = ν1.
This completes the proof.
By Proposition 3.8, it suffices to prove that Γ has a fixed point in order to establish the
existence of a mean-field equilibrium. To that end, we will use Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem [2, Corollary 17.55]. Note that, since w is a continuous moment function, the
set Ptv(X) is compact with respect to the weak topology [20, Proposition E.8, p. 187],
and so, Ptv(X × A) is tight as A is compact. Furthermore, P
t
v(X × A) is closed with
respect to the weak topology. Hence, Ptv(X× A) is compact with respect to the weak
topology. Therefore, Ξ is compact with respect to the product topology. In addition,
Ξ is also convex.
Note that it can be proved in the same way as in [27, Theorem 1] that C(ν) ∩
B(ν) 6= ∅ for any ν ∈ Ξ. Furthermore, we can show that both C(ν) and B(ν) are
convex, and thus their intersection is also convex. Moreover, Ξ is a convex compact
subset of a locally convex topological space M(X × A)∞, where M(X × A) denotes
the set of finite signed measures on X×A. The final piece we need in order to deduce
the existence of a fixed point of Γ by an appeal to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem is
the following:
Proposition 3.9. The graph of Γ, i.e., the set
Gr(Γ) := {(ν, ξ) ∈ Ξ× Ξ : ξ ∈ Γ(ν)} ,
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is closed.
Proof. Let
{
(ν(n), ξ(n))
}
n≥1
⊂ Ξ × Ξ be such that ξ(n) ∈ Γ(ν(n)) for all n and
(ν(n), ξ(n))→ (ν, ξ) as n → ∞ for some (ν, ξ) ∈ Ξ× Ξ. To prove Gr(Γ) is closed, it
is sufficient to prove ξ ∈ Γ(ν).
We first prove that ξ ∈ C(ν). For all n and t, we have
ξ
(n)
t+1,1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 )ν
(n)
t (dx, da). (3.4)
Since ξ(n) → ξ in Ξ, ξ
(n+1)
t+1 → ξt+1 weakly. Let g ∈ Cb(X). Then, by [37, Theorem
3.3], we have
lim
n→∞
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 )ν
(n)
t (dx, da) =
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)νt(dx, da)
since ν
(n)
t → νt weakly and
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 ) converges to
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
continuously2 (see [37, p. 388]). This implies that the sequence of measures on the
right-hand side of (3.4) converges weakly to
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, νt,1)νt(dx, da). Therefore,
we have
ξt+1,1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, νt,1)νt(dx, da),
from which we deduce that ξ ∈ C(ν).
It remains to prove that ξ ∈ B(ν). For each n and t, let us define
F
(n)
t (x, a) = c(x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 ) + β
∫
X
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 )
and
Ft(x, a) = c(x, a, νt,1) + β
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1).
Recall that, by definition,
Jν
(n)
∗,t (x) = min
a∈A
F
(n)
t (x, a) and J
ν
∗,t(x) = min
a∈A
Ft(x, a).
By assumption, we have
1 = ξ
(n)
t
({
(x, a) : F
(n)
t (x, a) = J
ν
(n)
∗,t (x)
})
, for all n.
Let A
(n)
t :=
{
(x, a) : F
(n)
t (x, a) = J
ν
(n)
∗,t (x)
}
. Since both F
(n)
t and J
ν
(n)
∗,t are continu-
ous, A
(n)
t is closed. Define At :=
{
(x, a) : Ft(x, a) = J
ν
∗,t(x)
}
which is also closed as
both Ft and J
ν
∗,t are continuous.
Suppose that F
(n)
t converges to Ft continuously and J
ν
(n)
∗,t converges to J
ν
∗,t con-
tinuously, as n→∞.
2Suppose g, gn (n ≥ 1) are measurable functions on metric space E. The sequence gn is said to
converge to g continuously if limn→∞ gn(en) = g(e) for any en → e where e ∈ E.
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For each M ≥ 1, define BMt :=
{
(x, a) : Ft(x, a) ≥ Jν∗,t(x) + ǫ(M)
}
which is
closed, where ǫ(M) → 0 as M → ∞. Since both Ft and Jν∗,t is continuous, we can
choose {ǫ(M)}M≥1 so that ξt(∂BMt ) = 0 for each M . Since A
c
t =
⋃∞
M=1 B
M
t and
BMt ⊂ B
M+1
t , we have by monotone convergence theorem
ξ
(n)
t
(
Act ∩ A
(n)
t
)
= lim inf
M→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A
(n)
t ).
Hence, we have
1 = lim sup
n→∞
lim inf
M→∞
{
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩A
(n)
t
)
+ ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A
(n)
t
)}
≤ lim inf
M→∞
lim sup
n→∞
{
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩A
(n)
t
)
+ ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩ A
(n)
t
)}
.
For fixed M , let us evaluate the limit of the second term in the last expression as
n→∞. First, note that ξ
(n)
t converges weakly to ξt as n→∞ when both measures are
restricted to BMt , as B
M
t is closed and ξt(∂B
M
t ) = 0 [10, Theorem 8.2.3]. Furthermore,
1
A
(n)
t ∩B
M
t
converges continuously to 0: if (x(n), a(n))→ (x, a) in BMt , then
lim
n→∞
F
(n)
t (x
(n), a(n)) = Ft(x, a)
≥ J∗,t(x) + ǫ(M)
= lim
n→∞
J
(n)
∗,t (x
(n)) + ǫ(M).
Hence, for large enough n’s, we have F
(n)
t (x
(n), a(n)) > J
(n)
∗,t (x
(n)) which implies that
(x(n), a(n)) 6∈ A
(n)
t . Then, by [37, Theorem 3.3], for each M we have
lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
BMt ∩A
(n)
t
)
= 0.
Therefore, we obtain
1 ≤ lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t
(
At ∩A
(n)
t
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
ξ
(n)
t (At)
≤ ξt(At),
where the last inequality follows from Portmanteau theorem [8, Theorem 2.1] and the
fact that At is closed. Hence, ξt(At) = 1. Since t is arbitrary, this is true for all t.
This means that ξ ∈ B(ν). Therefore, ξ ∈ Γ(ν) which completes the proof under
the assumption that F
(n)
t converges to Ft continuously and J
ν
(n)
∗,t converges to J
ν
∗,t
continuously, as n→∞, which we prove next.
Note that, for continuous functions, continuous convergence coincides with the
uniform convergence over compact sets (see [28, Lemma 2.1]). Therefore, it is equiva-
lent to establish that F
(n)
t uniformly converges to Ft over compact sets and J
ν
(n)
∗,t uni-
formly converges to Jν∗,t over compact sets, as these functions are all continuous. Fur-
thermore, if Jν
(n)
∗,t converges to J
ν
∗,t continuously for all t, then F
(n)
t also converges to
Ft continuously for all t. Indeed, let (x
(n), a(n))→ (x, a). Since Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y) ≤ Lt+1v(y)
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for all n ≥ 1 and
∫
X
v(y)p(dy|x(n), a(n), ν
(n)
t,1 ) →
∫
X
v(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1), by [37, Theo-
rem 3.3] we have
lim
n→∞
F
(n)
t (x
(n), a(n)) = lim
n→∞
[
c(x(n), a(n), ν
(n)
t,1 ) + β
∫
X
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y)p(dy|x
(n), a(n), ν
(n)
t,1 )
]
= c(x, a, νt,1) + β
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
= Ft(x, a).
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that Jν
(n)
∗,t uniformly converges to J
ν
∗,t over compact
sets, for all t.
Proposition 3.10. For any compact K ⊂ X, we have
lim
n→∞
sup
x∈K
∣∣J (n)∗,t (x)− J∗,t(x)| = 0
for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, J
(n)
∗,t converges to J∗,t continuously as n→∞, for all t.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.3 is now a consequence of the following:
Theorem 3.11. Under Assumption 1, there exists a fixed point ν of the set
valued mapping Γ : Ξ → 2Ξ. Therefore, the pair (π,ν1) is a mean field equilibrium,
where π and ν1 are constructed as in the statement of Proposition 3.8.
Proof. Recall that Ξ is a compact convex subset of the locally convex topological
spaceM(X×A)∞. Furthermore, Γ has closed graph by Proposition 3.9, and it takes
nonempty convex values. Therefore, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [2, Corollary
17.55], Γ has a fixed point. The second statement follows from Proposition 3.8.
4. Existence of Approximate Markov-Nash Equilibria. Now we are in a
position to prove the main result of the paper — namely, the existence of approximate
Markov-Nash equilibria in games with sufficiently many agents. Let (π,µ) denote the
mean-field equilibrium, which exists by Theorem 3.3. In a nutshell, the proof boils
down to showing that, if each of the N agents adopts the mean-field equilibrium policy
π, then the resulting policy pi(N) = {π, π, . . . , π} is an ε-Markov-Nash equilibrium for
all sufficiently large N .
In addition to Assumption 1, we impose Assumption 2 in this section. Further-
more, we assume that
(j) For each t ≥ 0, πt : X→ P(A) is weakly continuous.
The following theorem is the main result of the paper:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2, and (j) hold. Then, for any
ε > 0, there exists a positive integer N(ε), such that, for each N ≥ N(ε), the policy
pi(N) = {π, π, . . . , π} is an ε-Markov-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents.
The remainder of the section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.1. In a nutshell,
the logic of the proof can be described as follows: We first show that, as N →∞, the
empirical distribution of the agents’ states at each time t converges to a deterministic
limit given by the mean-field equilibrium distribution of the state at time t. This
allows us to deduce that the evolution of the state of a generic agent closely tracks
the equilibrium state-measure flow in the infinite-population limit. We then show
that the infinite-population limit is insensitive to individual-agent deviations from
the mean-field equilibrium policy.
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We start by defining a sequence of stochastic kernels
{
P pit ( · |x, µ)
}
t≥0
on X given
X× P(X) as
P pit ( · |x, µ) :=
∫
A
p( · |x, a, µ)πt(da|x).
Since πt is assumed to be weakly continuous, P
pi
t ( · |x, µ) is also weakly continuous in
(x, µ). In the sequel, to ease the notation, we will also write P pit ( · |x, µ) as P
pi
t,µ( · |x).
Recall that measure flow µ in the mean-field equilibrium satisfies
µt+1( · ) =
∫
X
P pit ( · |x, µt)µt(dx) = µtP
pi
t,µt
( · ).
For each N ≥ 1, let
{
xNi (t)
}
1≤i≤N
denote the state configuration at time t in the N -
person game under the policy pi(N), and let e
(N)
t denote the corresponding empirical
distribution.
Lemma 4.2. Fix an arbitrary N ≥ 1. Let pi(N
′) be arbitrary policy for the
N -agent game problem. Then, under pi(N
′), for all t ≥ 0 and i = 1, . . . , N , we have
L(xNi (t)) ∈ P
t
v(X).
Proof. The proof of the lemma is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.7.
Recall the Polish space (Pv(X), ρv). Define the Wasserstein distance of order 1 on
the set of probability measures P(Pv(X)) over Pv(X) as follows [39, Definition 6.1]:
W1(Φ,Ψ) := inf
{
E[ρv(X,Y )] : L(X) = Φ and L(Y ) = Ψ
}
.
Moreover, define the following spaces:
P1(Pv(X)) :=
{
Φ ∈ P(Pv(X)) :
∫
Pv(X)
ρv(µ, µ0)Φ(dµ) <∞
}
and
Cv(Pv(X)) :=
{
Υ : Pv(X)→ R; Υ is continuous and ‖Υ‖
∗
v <∞
}
.
Lemma 4.2 implies that L(e
(N)
t )(Pv(X)) = 1 and L(e
(N)
t )( · ) ∈ P1(Pv(X)), for all
N ≥ 1 and t ≥ 0.
Lemma 4.3. Let {Φn}n≥1 ⊂ P1(Pv(X)) and δµ ∈ P1(Pv(X)). Then the following
are equivalent.
(i) W1(Φn, δµ)→ 0 as n→∞.
(ii) E
[
|F (Xn) − F (X)|
]
→ 0 as n → ∞, for any F ∈ Cv(Pv(X)) and for any
sequence of Pv(X)-valued random elements {Xn}n≥1 and a Pv(X)-valued ran-
dom element X such that L(Xn) = Φn and L(X) = δµ.
(iii) E
[
|Xn(f) − X(f)|
]
→ 0 as n → ∞, for any f ∈ Cb(X) ∪ {v} and for any
sequence of Pv(X)-valued random elements {Xn}n≥1 and a Pv(X)-valued ran-
dom element X such that L(Xn) = Φn and L(X) = δµ.
Proof. (i)⇒ (iii)
Fix any {Xn}n≥1 and X that satisfy the hypothesis of (iii). We first prove the result
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for f ∈ Cb(X). Define ∆n( · ) := L(Xn, X)( · ). Since L(X) = δµ, the only coupling
between Φn and δµ is given by Φn ⊗ δµ. Therefore, ∆n = Φn ⊗ δµ. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
E
[
|Xn(f)−X(f)|
]
= lim
N→∞
∫
Pv(X)2
|ν(f)− ζ(f)|∆n(dν, dζ)
= lim
N→∞
∫
Pv(X)
|ν(f)− µ(f)|Φn(dν)
=
∫
Pv(X)
|ν(f)− µ(f)|δµ(dν) (4.1)
= 0,
where (4.1) follows from the fact that h(ν) := |ν(f) − µ(f)| ∈ Cb(Pv(X)) and Φn
converges to δµ weakly. This establishes the result for f ∈ Cb(X). For f = v, the
result follows from the definition of ρv and the fact that W1(Φn,Φ) = E
[
ρv(Xn, X)
]
since there is only one coupling between Φn and Φ.
Note that (iii), (ii)⇒ (i) is clear by definition of ρv.
(i)⇒ (ii)
Let F ∈ Cv(Pv(X)). Since the coupling between Φn and δµ is unique, we can write
E
[
|F (Xn)− F (X)|
]
=
∫
Pv(X)
|F (ν)− F (µ)|Φn(dν).
Define l(ν) := |F (ν)− F (µ)|. Since Φn → δµ weakly, we have [20, Proposition E.2]
lim inf
n→∞
∫
Pv(X)
l(ν) + ‖l‖∗vν(v)Φn(dν) ≥ l(µ) + ‖l‖
∗
vµ(v)
and
lim inf
n→∞
∫
Pv(X)
−l(ν) + ‖l‖∗vν(v)Φn(dν) ≥ −l(µ) + ‖l‖
∗
vµ(v)
as both l(ν)+ ‖l‖∗vν(v) and −l(ν)+ ‖l‖
∗
vν(v) are nonnegative continuous functions on
Pv(X). Note that
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
Pv(X)
ν(v)Φn(dν)− µ(v)
∣∣∣∣ = 0
by definition of ρv and (i). Thus, we have
lim inf
n→∞
∫
Pv(X)
l(ν)Φn(dν) ≥ l(µ)
≥ lim sup
n→∞
∫
Pv(X)
l(ν)Φn(dν).
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
∫
Pv(X)
l(ν)Φn(dν) = l(µ) = |F (µ)− F (µ)| = 0.
This completes the proof.
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The following proposition states that, at each time t, the sequence of random
measures e
(N)
t converges to the mean-field equilibrium distribution µt of the state at
time t as N →∞:
Proposition 4.4. For all t ≥ 0, limN→∞W1
(
L(e
(N)
t ), δµt
)
= 0 in P1
(
Pv(X)
)
.
Proof. We prove that
lim
N→∞
E
[
|e
(N)
t (f)− µt(f)|
]
= 0
for any f ∈ Cv(X) by induction on t. Since Cv(X) ⊃ Cb(X) ∪ {v}, this will complete
the proof by Lemma 4.3.
Note that since {xNi (0)}1≤i≤N ∼
∏N
i=1 µ0, the claim is true for t = 0 as any
f ∈ Cv(X) is µ0-integrable by Assumption 1-(e). Suppose the claim holds for t and
consider t+ 1. Fix any g ∈ Cv(X). Then, we have
|e
(N)
t+1(g)− µt+1(g)| ≤ |e
(N)
t+1(g)− e
(N)
t P
pi
t,e
(N)
t
(g)|+ |e
(N)
t P
pi
t,e
(N)
t
(g)− µtP
pi
t,µt
(g)|, (4.2)
where µt+1 = µtP
pi
t,µt
since (µt)t≥0 is the measure flow in the mean field equilibrium.
First, let us consider the second term in (4.2). Define F : Pv(X)→ R as
F (µ) = µP pit,µ(g) :=
∫
X
∫
X
g(y)P pit (dy|x, µ)µ(dx).
Note that
‖F‖∗v = sup
µ∈Pv(X)
|F (µ)|
µ(v)
= sup
µ∈Pv(X)
∣∣∫
X
∫
X
g(y)P pit (dy|x, µ)µ(dx)
∣∣
µ(v)
= sup
µ∈Pv(X)
∫
X
∫
X
|g(y)|P pit (dy|x, µ)µ(dx)
µ(v)
= sup
µ∈Pv(X)
∫
X
∫
X
‖g‖vv(y)P
pi
t (dy|x, µ)µ(dx)
µ(v)
= ‖g‖v sup
µ∈Pv(X)
αµ(v)
µ(v)
= α‖g‖v.
Hence, ‖F‖∗v < ∞. If we can prove that F is also continuous, then by Lemma 4.3
the expectation of the second term in (4.2) goes to zero. To this end, let µn → µ in
Pv(X) with respect to v-topology. Define
ln(x) :=
∫
X
g(y)P pit (dy|x, µn)
and
l(x) :=
∫
X
g(y)P pit (dy|x, µ).
Note that F (µn) =
∫
X
ln(x)µn(dx) and F (µ) =
∫
X
l(x)µ(dx). We first prove that ln
converges continuously to l. Let xn → x. Since πt is assumed to be continuous, we
have πt( · |xn)→ πt( · |x) weakly. Note that
sup
n≥1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|xn, a, µn)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖g‖vα sup
n≥1
v(xn) <∞
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since v is continuous and {xn} is convergent. Therefore, by [37, Theorem 3.3] we have
lim
n→∞
ln(xn) = lim
n→∞
∫
A
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|xn, a, µn)πt(da|xn)
=
∫
A
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|x, a, µ)πt(da|x)
= l(x). (4.3)
Thus, ln converges to l continuously. In addition, we have |ln(x)| ≤ α‖g‖vv(x) for all
x ∈ X and µn(v)→ µ(v). Then, again by [37, Theorem 3.3], we have
lim
n→∞
F (µn) = lim
n→∞
∫
X
ln(x)µn(dx)
=
∫
X
l(x)µ(dx)
= F (µ).
Hence, F ∈ Cv(Pv(X)) and so the expectation of the second term in (4.2) goes to
zero.
Now, consider the first term in (4.2). Let us write the expectation of this term as
E
[
E
[
|e
(N)
t+1(g)− e
(N)
t P
pi
t,e
(N)
t
(g)|
∣∣∣∣xN1 (t), . . . , xNN (t)
]]
.
Then, by Lemma 6.2 in Appendix D, we have
E
[
E
[
|e
(N)
t+1(g)− e
(N)
t P
pi
t,e
(N)
t
(g)|
∣∣∣∣xN1 (t), . . . , xNN (t)
]]2
≤ E
[
E
[
|e
(N)
t+1(g)− e
(N)
t P
pi
t,e
(N)
t
(g)|
∣∣∣∣xN1 (t), . . . , xNN (t)
]2]
≤ E
[
1
N2
N∑
i=1
{∫
X
g2(y)P pi
t,e
(N)
t
(dy|xNi (t))
+
(∫
X
g(y)P pi
t,e
(N)
t
(dy|xNi (t))
)2}]
≤ E
[
‖g‖2v
N2
N∑
i=1
{∫
X
v2(y)P pi
t,e
(N)
t
(dy|xNi (t))
+
(∫
X
v(y)P pi
t,e
(N)
t
(dy|xNi (t))
)2}]
≤
‖g‖2v
N2
N∑
i=1
E
[
Bv2(xNi (t)) + α
2v2(xNi (t))
]
.
The last expression follows from Assumption 1-(c) and Assumption 2-(i). For any
t ≥ 0, one can prove that supN≥1 supi=1,...,N E[v
2(xNi (t))] ≤ H for some H ∈ R by
Assumption 2-(i). Therefore, the expectation of the first term in (4.2) also converges
to zero as N →∞. Since g is arbitrary, this completes the proof.
From the above proposition and from the assumed continuity of the transition
probability p( · |x, a, µ) in µ, we now deduce that the evolution of the state of a generic
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agent in the original game with sufficiently many agents should closely track the
evolution of the state in the mean-field game:
Proposition 4.5. If (π,µ) is a mean-field equilibrium, then
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (pi
(N)) = Jµ(π) = inf
pi′∈Π
Jµ(π
′).
Proof. For each t ≥ 0, let us define
cpit(x, µ) :=
∫
A
c(x, a, µ)πt(da|x).
Note that, for any permutation σ which is independent of xN1 (t), . . . , x
N
N (t), we have
L
(
xN1 (t), . . . , x
N
N (t), e
(N)
t
)
= L
(
xNσ(1)(t), . . . , x
N
σ(N)(t), e
(N)
t
)
.
Therefore, we can write
E
[
c(xN1 (t), a
N
1 (t), e
(N)
t )
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
c(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
= E
[
e
(N)
t
(
cpit(x, e
(N)
t )
)]
.
Define F : Pv(X)→ R as
F (µ) :=
∫
X
cpit(x, µ)µ(dx).
Hence, E
[
c(xN1 (t), a
N
1 (t), e
(N)
t )
]
= E
[
F (e
(N)
t )
]
. First, note that
‖F‖∗v
= sup
µ∈Pv(X)
∣∣∫
X×A
c(x, a, µ)πt(da|x)µ(dx)
∣∣
µ(v)
≤ sup
µ∈Pv(X)
∣∣∫
X
cpit(x, µ)µ(dx) −
∫
X
cpit(x, µt)µ(dx)
∣∣
µ(v)
+ sup
µ∈Pv(X)
∣∣∫
X
cpit(x, µt)µ(dx)
∣∣
µ(v)
≤ sup
µ∈Pv(X)
ωc(ρ˜v(µ, µt))
µ(v)
+ sup
µ∈Pv(X)
Mtµ(v)
µ(v)
= ‖ω(ρ˜v( · , µt))‖
∗
v +Mt <∞. (by Assumption 2-(h))
Hence, F has finite v-norm. For continuity, let µn → µ in v-topology. Then, we have
|F (µn)− F (µ)| ≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
cpit(x, µn)µn(dx)−
∫
X
cpit(x, µ)µn(dx)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
cpit(x, µ)µn(dx) −
∫
X
cpit(x, µ)µ(dx)
∣∣∣∣
≤ ωc(ρ˜v(µn, µ)) +
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
cpit(x, µ)µn(dx) −
∫
X
cpit(x, µ)µ(dx)
∣∣∣∣.
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Note that cpit(x, µ) ∈ Cv(X) since πt is weakly continuous and µ ∈ P
l
v(X) for some
l ≥ 1. Therefore, the last expression goes to zero as µn → µ in v-topology. Hence,
F ∈ Cv(Pv(X)). Therefore, by Proposition 4.4 we have
lim
N→∞
E
[
c(xN1 (t), a
N
1 (t), e
(N)
t )
]
= lim
N→∞
E
[
e
(N)
t
(
cpit(x, e
(N)
t )
)]
= lim
N→∞
E[F (e
(N)
t )]
= F (µt)
= µt(cpit(x, µt)). (4.4)
Since t is arbitrary, this is true for all t ≥ 0. Recall that the pair (π,µ) is a mean
field equilibrium, and so we can write
Jµ(π) =
∞∑
t=0
βtµt(cpit(x, µt)).
Note that for all N ≥ 1
J
(N)
1 (pi
(N)) =
∞∑
t=0
βtE
[
c(xN1 (t), a
N
1 (t), e
(N)
t )
]
≤
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
E
[
|c(xN1 (t), a
N
1 (t), e
(N)
t )− c(x
N
1 (t), a
N
1 (t), µ0)|
]
+ E
[
c(xN1 (t), a
N
1 (t), µ0)
]}
≤
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
E
[
ωc(ρ˜v(e
(N)
t , µ0))
]
+ E
[
M0v(x
N
1 (t))
]}
≤
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
‖ωc(ρ˜v( · , µ0))‖
∗
vE
[
e
(N)
t (v)
]
+M0E
[
v(xN1 (t))
]}
≤
(
‖ωc(ρ˜v( · , µ0))‖
∗
v +M0
)
M
∞∑
t=0
(βα)t
<∞.
Therefore, by (4.4) and the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (pi
(N)) = Jµ(π)
which completes the proof.
Now let {π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ Mc1 be an arbitrary sequence of weakly continuous Markov
policies for Agent 1. For each N ≥ 1, let
{
x˜Ni (t)
}
1≤i≤N
be the state configuration
at time t in the N -person game under the policy p˜i(N) := {π˜(N), π, . . . , π} (i.e., when
Agents 2 through N stick to the mean-field equilibrium policy π, while Agent 1
deviates with π˜(N)), and let e˜
(N)
t denote the corresponding empirical distribution. The
following result, whose proof is a slight modification of the proof of Proposition 4.4,
states that, in the infinite-population limit, the law of the empirical distribution of the
states at each time t is insensitive to local deviations from the mean-field equilibrium
policy:
Proposition 4.6. For each t ≥ 0, limN→∞W1
(
L(e˜
(N)
t ), δµt
)
= 0 in P1(Pv(X)).
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Proof. We follow the same technique that was employed in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.4. Namely, we prove that
lim
N→∞
E
[
|e˜
(N)
t (f)− µt(f)|
]
= 0
for any f ∈ Cv(X) by induction on t.
Since
{
x˜Ni (0)
}
1≤i≤N
∼
∏N
i=1 µ0, the claim holds for t = 0. Suppose the claim
holds for t and consider t+ 1. Choose any g ∈ Cv(X) and write
|e˜
(N)
t+1(g)− µt+1(g)| ≤ |e˜
(N)
t+1(g)− e˜
(N−1)
t+1 (g)|
+ |e˜
(N−1)
t+1 (g)− e˜
(N−1)
t P
pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(g)|
+ |e˜
(N−1)
t P
pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(g)− e˜
(N)
t P
pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(g)|
+ |e˜
(N)
t P
pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(g)− µtP
pi
t,µt
(g)|, (4.5)
where e˜
(N−1)
t+1 and e˜
(N−1)
t are given by
e˜
(N−1)
t+1 :=
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δ
x˜
(N)
i
(t+1)
and
e˜
(N−1)
t :=
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δ
x˜
(N)
i
(t)
.
In the remainder of the proof, we show that expectation of each term in (4.5) converges
to zero as N →∞, which will complete the proof as g is arbitrary.
First, let us consider the first term in (4.5). We have
|e˜
(N)
t+1(g)− e˜
(N−1)
t+1 (g)| ≤
∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
g(x˜Ni (t+ 1))−
1
N
N∑
i=2
g(x˜Ni (t+ 1))
∣∣∣∣
∨
∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
g(x˜Ni (t+ 1))−
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
g(x˜Ni (t+ 1))
∣∣∣∣
When we take the expectation of above term, we obtain
E
[
|e˜
(N)
t+1(g)− e˜
(N−1)
t+1 (g)|
]
≤
1
N
E
[
|g(x˜N1 (t+ 1))|
]
+
∣∣∣∣ 1N − 1N − 1
∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
E
[
|g(x˜Ni (t+ 1))|
]
≤
‖g‖v
N
αt+1M +
∣∣∣∣1− NN − 1
∣∣∣∣‖g‖vαt+1M.
Note that the last expression goes to zero as N →∞.
We can write the expectation of the second term in (4.5) as
E
[
E
[
|e˜
(N−1)
t+1 (g)− e˜
(N−1)
t P
pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(g)|
∣∣∣∣x˜N1 (t), . . . , x˜NN (t)
]]
.
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Using Lemma 6.2 in Appendix D, we can prove that this term converges to zero as in
the proof of Proposition 4.4.
For the expectation of the third term in (4.5), we have
E
[
|e˜
(N−1)
t P
pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(g)− e˜
(N)
t P
pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(g)|
]
= E
[∣∣∣∣
∫
X
∫
X
g(y)P pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(dy|x)e˜
(N−1)
t (dx)
−
∫
X
∫
X
g(y)P pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(dy|x)e˜
(N)
t (dx)
∣∣∣∣
]
≤
1
N
E
[∣∣∣∣
∫
X
g(y)P pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(dy|x˜N1 (t))
∣∣∣∣
]
+
∣∣∣∣ 1N − 1N − 1
∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣∣
∫
X
g(y)P pi
t,e˜
(N)
t
(dy|x˜Ni (t))
∣∣∣∣
]
≤
‖g‖vα
N
E
[
v(x˜N1 (t))
]
+
∣∣∣∣1− NN − 1
∣∣∣∣‖g‖vα
N∑
i=1
E
[
v(x˜Ni (t))
]
≤
‖g‖v
N
αt+1M +
∣∣∣∣1− NN − 1
∣∣∣∣‖g‖vαt+1M.
Again, the last expression goes to zero as N →∞.
For the last term in (4.5), let us define F : Pv(X) → R as F (µ) := µP pit,µ(g).
Since πt is weakly continuous, it can be proven as in the proof of Proposition 4.4 that
F ∈ CV (Pv(X)). Then, by Lemma 4.3, the expectation of the last term converges
to zero since L(e˜
(N)
t ) → δµt with respect to W1 distance in P1
(
Pv(X)
)
by induction
hypothesis. This completes the proof.
For each N ≥ 1, let {xˆN(t)}t≥0 denote the states of the non-homogenous Markov
chain that evolves as follows:
xˆN (0) ∼ µ0 and xˆ
N (t+ 1) ∼ P p˜i
(N)
t,µt
( · |xˆN (t)).
Note that
Jµ(π˜
(N)) =
∞∑
t=0
βtE
[
c(xˆN (t), aˆN (t), µt)
]
.
Lemma 4.7. Let F be a family of equicontinuous functions on Pv(X) with respect
to v-topology. For any t ≥ 0, define Ft : Pv(X)→ [0,+∞] as:
Ft(µ) := sup
Ψ∈F
|Ψ(µ)−Ψ(µt)|.
Suppose that Ft is real valued and ‖Ft‖∗v <∞. Then Ft ∈ Cv(Pv(X)). Therefore,
lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
Ψ∈F
∣∣Ψ(e˜(N)t )−Ψ(µt)∣∣
]
= 0.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that Ft is continuous with respect to v-topology.
Let µn → µ in v-topology. Then we have
|Ft(µn)− Ft(µ)| =
∣∣ sup
Ψ∈F
|Ψ(µn)−Ψ(µt)| − sup
Ψ∈F
|Ψ(µ)−Ψ(µt)|
∣∣
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≤ sup
Ψ∈F
|Ψ(µn)−Ψ(µ)| → 0
as N →∞ since F is equicontinuous. This completes the proof.
Using Lemma 4.7 we now prove the following result.
Lemma 4.8. Fix any t ≥ 0. Suppose that
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(x˜N1 (t))(gN )− L(xˆN1 (t))(gN )∣∣ = 0
for any sequence {gN}N≥1 ⊂ Cv(X) with supN≥1 ‖gN‖v <∞. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(x˜N1 (t), e˜(N)t )(TN )− L(xˆN1 (t), δµt)(TN )∣∣ = 0
for any sequence {TN} of functions on X× Pv(X) satisfying:
(i) The family
{
TN (x, · ) : x ∈ X, N ≥ 1)
}
is equicontinuous with respect to
v-topology.
(ii) TN( · , µ) ∈ Cv(X) for all µ ∈ Pv(X) and N ≥ 1.
(iii) supN≥1 ‖TN( · , µ)‖v <∞ for all µ ∈ Pv(X).
(iv) The function Ft(µ) := supx∈X
N≥1
|TN (x, µ)− TN(x, µt)| on Pv(X) is real valued
and ‖Ft‖∗v <∞.
Proof. Fix any sequence {TN}N≥1 satisfying the hypothesis of the lemma. Then,
we have ∣∣L(x˜N1 (t), e˜(N)t )(TN )− L(xˆN1 (t), δµt)(TN )∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×Pv(X)
TN (x, µ)L(x˜
N
1 (t), e˜
(N)
t )(dx, dµ)
−
∫
X×Pv(X)
TN (x, µ)L(x˜
N
1 (t), δµt)(dx, dµ)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×Pv(X)
TN(x, µ)L(x˜
N
1 (t), δµt)(dx, dµ)
−
∫
X×Pv(X)
TN (x, µ)L(xˆ
N
1 (t), δµt)(dx, dµ)
∣∣∣∣. (4.6)
First, let us consider the second term in (4.6). We have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
TN(x, µt)L(x˜
N
1 (t))(dx) −
∫
X
TN(x, µt)L(xˆ
N
1 (t))(dx)
∣∣∣∣ = 0
as {TN( · , µt)}N≥1 ⊂ Cv(X) with supN≥1 ‖TN( · , µt)‖v <∞.
Now, consider the first term in (4.6). To this end, let us define F :=
{
TN (x, · ) :
x ∈ X, N ≥ 1)
}
. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×Pv(X)
TN (x, µ)L(x˜
N
1 (t), e˜
(N)
t )(dx, dµ)
−
∫
X×Pv(X)
TN(x, µ)L(x˜
N
1 (t), δµt)(dx, dµ)
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
N→∞
∫
X
∣∣∣∣
∫
Pv(X)
TN (x, µ)L(e˜
(N)
t |x˜
N
1 (t))(dµ|dx)
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−∫
Pv(X)
TN(x, µ)L(δµt )(dµ)
∣∣∣∣L(x˜N1 (t))(dx)
≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
E
[∣∣TN(x˜N1 (t), e˜(N)t )− TN(x˜N1 (t), µt)∣∣
∣∣∣∣x˜N1 (t)
]]
≤ lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
Ψ∈F
∣∣Ψ(e˜(N)t )−Ψ(µt)∣∣
]
= 0 (by Lemma 4.7).
This completes the proof.
For any sequence {gN}N≥1 ⊂ Cv(X) with supN≥1 ‖gN‖v =: L < ∞ and for any
t ≥ 0, let us define
lN,t(x, µ) :=
∫
A×X
gN (y)p(dy|x, a, µ)π˜
(N)
t (da|x).
Note that for any (µ, ν) ∈ Pv(X)2, we have
sup
x∈X
N≥1
|lN,t(x, µ)− lN,t(x, ν)| ≤ L sup
x∈X
∫
A
‖p( · |x, a, µ)− p( · |x, a, ν)‖vπ˜
(N)
t (da|x)
≤ Lωp(ρ˜v(µ, ν)).
Since ωp(r)→ 0 as r → 0 by Assumption 2-(h), the family {lN,t(x, · ) : x ∈ X, N ≥ 1}
is equicontinuous. Moreover, the function
Ft(µ) := sup
x∈X
N≥1
|lN,t(x, µ) − lN,t(x, µt)| ≤ Lωp(ρ˜v(µ, µt))
is real-valued and ‖Ft‖∗v < ∞ since ‖ωp(ρ˜v( · , µt))‖
∗
v < ∞ by again Assumption 2-
(h). Note also that lN,t( · , µ) ∈ Cv(X) for all µ ∈ Pv(X) and N ≥ 1, and
supN≥1 ‖lN,t( · , µ)‖v <∞ for all µ ∈ Pv(X).
Indeed, we have |lN,t(x, µ)| ≤ Lαv(x), and so, lN,t( · , µ) ∈ Bv(X) for all µ ∈
Pv(X). Furthermore, if xn → x in X, then since
rn(a) :=
∫
X
gN (y)p(dy|xn, a, µ)
continuously converges to
r(a) :=
∫
X
gN (y)p(dy|x, a, µ)
and ‖rn‖ ≤ Lv(xn) ≤ L supn≥1 v(xn) < ∞, we have limn→∞ lN,t(xn, µ) = lN,t(x, µ)
by [37, Theorem 3.3] as π˜
(N)
t is assumed to be weakly continuous. Hence, lN,t( · , µ) ∈
Cv(X). We also have
sup
N≥1
sup
x∈X
|lN,t(x, µ)|
v(x)
= sup
N≥1
sup
x∈X
∣∣∫
A×X
gN (y)p(dy|x, a, µ)π˜
(N)
t (da|x)
∣∣
v(x)
≤ L sup
x∈X
∫
A×X v(y)p(dy|x, a, µ)π˜
(N)
t (da|x)
v(x)
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≤ Lα <∞.
Hence, supN≥1 ‖lN,t( · , µ)‖v < ∞. Using these observations, we now prove the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 4.9. For any sequence {gN}N≥1 ⊂ Cv(X) with supN≥1 ‖gN‖v <∞
and for any t ≥ 0, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(x˜N1 (t))(gN )− L(xˆN1 (t))(gN )∣∣ = 0.
Therefore, by Lemma 4.8, for any t ≥ 0, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣L(x˜N1 (t), e˜(N)t )(TN )− L(xˆN1 (t), δµt)(TN )∣∣ = 0
for any sequence {TN} of functions on X × Pv(X) satisfying hypothesis (i)-(iv) in
Lemma 4.8.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on t. The claim trivially holds for t = 0
as L(x˜N1 (0)) = L(xˆ
N
1 (0)) = µ0 for all N ≥ 1. Suppose the claim holds for t and
consider t+ 1. We can write
∣∣L(x˜N1 (t+ 1))(gN )− L(xˆN1 (t+ 1))(gN )∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×Pv(X)
lN,t(x, µ)L(x˜
N
1 (t), e˜
(N)
t )(dx, dµ)
−
∫
X×Pv(X)
lN,t(x, µ)L(xˆ
N
1 (t), δµt)(dx, dµ)
∣∣∣∣.
Since the family {lN,t}N≥1 satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma 4.8 as we showed above,
the last term converges to zero as N →∞. This completes the proof.
Recall that we have
Jµ(π˜
(N)) =
∞∑
t=0
βtE
[
c(xˆN (t), aˆN (t), µt)
]
.
Theorem 4.10. Let {π˜(N)}N≥1 ⊂ M
c
1 be an arbitrary sequence of policies for
Agent 1. Then, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣J (N)1 (π˜(N), π, . . . , π)− Jµ(π˜(N))∣∣ = 0.
Proof. Fix any t ≥ 0 and define
TN,t(x, µ) :=
∫
A
c(x, a, µ)π˜
(N)
t (da|x).
Note that for any (µ, ν) ∈ Pv(X)2, we have
sup
x∈X
N≥1
∣∣TN,t(x, µ)− TN,t(x, ν)∣∣ = sup
x∈X
N≥1
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
c(x, a, µ)π˜
(N)
t (da|x)−
∫
A
c(x, a, ν)π˜
(N)
t (da|x)
∣∣∣∣
≤ ωc(ρ˜v(µ, ν)).
Since ωc(r) → 0 as r → 0, the family
{
TN,t(x, · ) : x ∈ X, N ≥ 1
}
is equicontinuous.
Moreover, the function
Ft(µ) := sup
x∈X
N≥1
∣∣TN,t(x, µ)− TN,t(x, µt)∣∣
26
is real-valued and ‖Ft‖∗v <∞.
One can also prove that TN( · , µ) ∈ Cv(X) for all N ≥ 1 and µ ∈ Pv(X), and
supN≥1 ‖TN( · , µ)‖v <∞ for all µ ∈ Pv(X). Therefore, by Proposition 4.9, we have
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣E[c(x˜N1 , a˜N1 , e˜(N)t )]− E[c(xˆN1 , aˆN1 , µt)]
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Since t is arbitrary, above result holds for all t ≥ 0. By using the same method as in
the last part of Proposition 4.5, we can conclude that
lim
N→∞
∣∣J (N)1 (π˜(N), π, . . . , π)− Jµ(π˜(N))∣∣ = 0.
by the dominated convergence theorem.
As a corollary of Proposition 4.5 and Theorem 4.10, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.11. We have
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π, . . . , π) ≥ inf
pi′∈Π
Jµ(π
′)
= Jµ(π)
= lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π, π, . . . , π).
Now we are ready to prove the main result of the paper:
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 4.1] For sufficiently large N , we need to prove that
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) ≤ inf
pii∈Mc
i
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i) + ε (4.7)
for each i = 1, . . . , N . Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost func-
tions are the same for all agents, it is sufficient to prove (4.7) for Agent 1 only. Given
ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, let π˜(N) ∈ Mc1 be such that
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π, . . . , π) < inf
pi′∈Mc1
J
(N)
1 (π
′, π, . . . , π) +
ε
3
.
Then, by Corollary 4.11, we have
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π, . . . , π) = lim
N→∞
Jµ(π˜
(N))
≥ inf
pi′
Jµ(π
′)
= Jµ(π)
= lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π, π, . . . , π).
Therefore, there exists N(ε) such that
inf
pi′∈Mc1
J
(N)
1 (π
′, π, . . . , π) + ε > J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), π, . . . , π) +
2ε
3
≥ Jµ(π) +
ε
3
≥ J
(N)
1 (π, π, . . . , π).
for all N ≥ N(ε).
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5. Example. In this section, we consider an example, the additive noise model,
in order to illustrate our results. In this model, the dynamics of a generic agent for
N -agent game problem are given by
xNi (t+ 1) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), x
N
j (t)) + g(x
N
i (t), a
N
i (t))w
N
i (t), (5.1)
where xNi (t), x
N
j (t) ∈ X, a
N
i (t) ∈ A, and w
N
i (t) ∈ W. Here, we assume that X =
W = R, A ⊂ R, and the ‘noise’ {wNi (t)} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with
standard normal distribution. Note that we can write (5.1) as
xNi (t+ 1) =
∫
X
f(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), y) e
(N)
t (dy) + g(x
N
i (t), a
N
i (t))w
N
i (t)
= F (xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t ) + g(x
N
i (t), a
N
i (t))w
N
i (t),
where F (x, a, µ) :=
∫
X
f(x, a, y)µ(dy). The one-stage cost function of a generic agent
is given by
c(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t ) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
d(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), x
N
j (t))
=
∫
X
d(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), y) e
(N)
t (dy),
for some measurable function d : X× A× X→ [0,∞).
For this model, Assumption 1 holds with w(x) = v(x) = 1+x2 under the following
conditions: (i) A is compact, (ii) g is continuous, and f is bounded and continuous,
(iii) supa∈A g
2(x, a) ≤ Lx2 for some L > 0, (iv) sup(x,a,y)∈K×A×X d(x, a, y) < ∞ for
any compact K ⊂ X, (v) d(x, a, y) ≤ Rw(x)w(y) for some R > 0, (vi) ωd(r) → 0 as
r → 0, where
ωd(r) = sup
y∈X
sup
(x,a),(x′,a′):
|x−x′|+|a−a′|≤r
|d(x, a, y)− d(x, a, y)|,
(vii) α2β < 1, where α = max{1 + ‖f‖, L}.
Indeed, we have∫
X
(1 + y2)p(dy|x, a, µ) =
∫
X
(
1 +
[
F (x, a, µ) + g(x, a)y
]2)
q(y)m(dy)
≤ 1 + ‖f‖2 + g2(x, a) ≤ α(1 + x2),
where q is density of the standard normal distribution and m is the Lebesgue mea-
sure. Hence, Assumption 1-(c) holds. In order to verify Assumption 1-(d), suppose
(xn, an, µn)→ (x, a, µ) and let g ∈ Cb(X). Then, we have
lim
n→∞
∫
X
g(y)p(dy|xn, an, µn) = lim
n→∞
∫
X
g
(
F (xn, an, µn) + g(xn, an)z
)
q(z)m(dz)
=
∫
X
g
(
F (x, a, µ) + g(x, a)z
)
q(z)m(dz)
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since g and F are continuous, where the continuity of F follows from [37, Theorem
3.3] and the fact that f is bounded and continuous. Therefore, the transition prob-
ability p( · |x, a, µ) is weakly continuous. Similarly, one can verify that the function∫
X
(1 + y2)p(dy|x, a, µ) is continuous. Thus, Assumption 1-(d) holds. Note that As-
sumption 1-(e) holds if the initial distribution µ0 has a finite second moment. Finally,
we will verify Assumption 1-(a) and (f). For (a), suppose (xn, an, µn) → (x, a, µ).
Then, we have
|c(xn, an, µn)− c(x, a, µ)| =
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
d(xn, an, y)µn(dy)−
∫
X
d(x, a, y)µ(dy)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
d(xn, an, y)µn(dy)−
∫
X
d(x, a, y)µn(dy)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫
X
d(x, a, y)µn(dy)−
∫
X
d(x, a, y)µ(dy)
∣∣∣∣
≤ ωd
(
|xn − x|+ |an − a|
)
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
d(x, a, y)µn(dy)−
∫
X
d(x, a, y)µ(dy)
∣∣∣∣.
The last expression goes to zero as N → ∞, since d(x, a, · ) ∈ Cb(X) and ωd(r) → 0
as r → 0. Thus, c is continuous. For (f), we have
sup
(a,µ)∈A×Ptv(X)
c(x, a, µ) = sup
(a,µ)∈A×Ptv(X)
∫
X
d(x, a, y)µ(dy)
≤ Rv(x) sup
(a,µ)∈A×Ptv(X)
∫
X
v(y)µ(dy) ≤ Rαtv(x).
Hence, Assumption 1-(f) holds with γ = α. Therefore, under (i)-(vii), there exists a
mean-field equilibrium for the mean-field game that arises from the above finite-agent
game problem.
For the same model, Assumption 2 holds under the following conditions: (viii)
d(x, a, y) is (uniformly) Ho¨lder continuous in y with exponent p and Ho¨lder constant
Kd, (ix) f(x, a, y) is (uniformly) Ho¨lder continuous in y with exponent p and Ho¨lder
constant Kf , (x) g is bounded and inf(x,a)∈X×A |g(x, a)| =: θ > 0.
Indeed, we have
ωc(r) = sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
d(x, a, y)µ(dy)−
∫
X
d(x, a, y)ν(dy)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
KdWp(µ, ν)
p
≤ Kdr
p.
Hence, ωc(r) → 0 as r → 0 and ωc(ρ˜( · , µ)) has a finite v-norm. Therefore, Assump-
tion 2-(h) holds for ωc. For ωp, we have
ωp(r) = sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
‖p( · |x, a, µ)− p( · |x, a, ν)‖v
= sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
sup
l∈Lipλ(1,R)
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
l
(
F (x, a, µ) + g(x, a)z
)
q(z)m(dz)
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−∣∣∣∣
∫
X
l(F (x, a, ν) + g(x, a)z)q(z)m(dz)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
sup
l∈Lipλ(1,R)
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
l
(
g(x, a)z
)
q
(
z −
F (x, a, µ)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
−
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
l
(
g(x, a)z
)
q
(
z −
F (x, a, ν)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣
≤ ‖l‖ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
sup
h∈Lipλ(1,R)
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
h(z)q
(
z −
F (x, a, µ)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
−
∫
X
h(z)q
(
z −
F (x, a, ν)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣, (5.2)
where (5.2) follows from the fact that l(g(x, a) · ) ∈ Lipλ(‖l‖,R). Note that for any
compact interval K = [−k, k] ⊂ X, we can upper bound (5.2) as follows:
(5.2) ≤ ‖l‖ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
sup
h∈Lipλ(1,R)
(∣∣∣∣
∫
K
h(z)q
(
z −
F (x, a, µ)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
−
∫
K
h(z)q
(
z −
F (x, a, ν)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣
+
∫
Kc
|h(z)|q
(
z −
F (x, a, µ)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz) +
∫
Kc
|h(z)|q
(
z −
F (x, a, ν)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
)
≤ ‖l‖ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
sup
h∈Lipλ(1,R)
(∣∣∣∣
∫
K
h(z)q
(
z −
F (x, a, µ)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
−
∫
K
h(z)q
(
z −
F (x, a, ν)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣
+
∫
Kc
(1 + z2)q
(
z −
F (x, a, µ)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz) +
∫
Kc
(1 + z2)q
(
z −
F (x, a, ν)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
)
(5.3)
Note that the last two terms in the last expression go to zero (uniformly in (x, a, µ, ν))
as k →∞, since F and g are bounded, and inf(x,a)∈X×A |g(x, a)| > 0. For any ε > 0,
let Kε = [−kε, kε] ⊂ X so that the sum of these terms is less than ε for all (x, a, µ, ν).
Let us define the Lipschitz seminorm of q on Kε as
Tε := sup
(x,z)∈Kε×Kε
x 6=z
|q(x)− q(z)|
|x− z|
.
Then, we have
(5.3) ≤ ‖l‖ sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
sup
h∈Lipλ(1,R)
∣∣∣∣
∫
Kε
h(z)q
(
z −
F (x, a, µ)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
−
∫
Kε
h(z)q
(
z −
F (x, a, ν)
g(x, a)
)
m(dz)
∣∣∣∣+ ‖l‖ε
≤ ‖l‖Tε sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
sup
h∈Lipλ(1,R)
∫
Kε
|h(z)|
∣∣∣∣F (x, a, µ)g(x, a) − F (x, a, ν)g(x, a)
∣∣∣∣m(dz)
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+ ‖l‖ε
≤
‖l‖Tε
θ
∫
Kε
(1 + z2)m(dz) sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
|F (x, a, µ)− F (x, a, ν)|+ ‖l‖ε
≤
‖l‖Tε
θ
∫
Kε
(1 + z2)m(dz) sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ˜v(µ,ν)≤r
KfWp(µ, ν)
p + ‖l‖ε
≤
‖l‖Tε
θ
∫
Kε
(1 + z2)m(dz)Kfr
p + ‖l‖ε.
Since ε is arbitrary, we have ωp(r) → 0 as r → 0 and ωp(ρ˜v( · , µ)) has finite v-
norm. Thus, Assumption 2-(h) holds. Finally, it is straightforward to prove that
Assumption 2-(i) holds, since the noise has a standard normal distribution. Therefore,
under (viii)-(x), Assumption 2 holds.
The final piece in order to deduce the existence of approximate Markov-Nash
equilibria in the above game with sufficiently many agents is to prove condition (j).
However, verification of (j) is highly dependent on the systems components, and so,
it is quite difficult to find a global assumption in order to satisfy (j). One way to
establish this is as follows. For any h ∈ Cv(X) and ν ∈ Pv(X), define
Rν,h(x, a) := c(x, a, ν) + β
∫
X
h(y)p(dy|x, a, ν)
= c(x, a, ν) + β
∫
X
h
(
F (x, a, ν) + g(x, a)z
)
q(z)m(dz).
Using this, let us state the following condition:
(j’) For any h ∈ Cv(X) and ν ∈ Pv(X), there a exists unique minimizer ax ∈ A of
Rν,h(x, · ), for each x ∈ X.
Under assumption (j’), we can establish that the policy in the mean field equilibrium
satisfies the weak continuity condition (j).
Indeed, fix any t ≥ 0 and consider the policy πt at time t in π, where π is the
policy in the mean-field equilibrium. By (j’), we must have πt( · |x) = δft(x)( · ) for
some ft : X → A which minimizes some function Rν,h(x, a) of the above form; that
is, mina∈ARν,h(x, a) = Rν,h(x, ft(x)) for all x ∈ X. If ft is continuous, then πt
is also continuous. Hence, in order to prove (j), it is sufficient to prove that ft is
continuous. Suppose xn → x in X. Note that l( · ) = mina∈XRν( · , a) is continuous.
Therefore, every accumulation point of the sequence {ft(xn)}n≥1 must be a minimizer
for Rν,h(x, · ). Since there exists a unique minimizer ft(x) of Rν,h(x, · ), the set of
all accumulation points of {ft(xn)}n≥1 must be {ft(x)}. This implies that ft(xn)
converges to ft(x) since A is compact. Hence, ft is continuous.
Remark 6. We note that, using similar ideas, the finite-horizon cost criterion;
that is,
E
[ T∑
t=0
c(x(t), a(t), µt)
]
for some T <∞, (5.4)
can be handled with the same quantitative results. The only part that needs to verified
differently from the infinite-horizon case is Proposition 3.10. Namely, we have to
establish that F
(n)
t and J
ν
(n)
∗,t continuously converge to Ft and J
ν
∗,t, respectively, since
31
we cannot use the fixed-point argument anymore (see the proof of Proposition 3.10).
Note that, in finite-horizon case, for each n and t < T , these functions are given by
F
(n)
t (x, a) = c(x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 ) +
∫
X
Jν
(n)
∗,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 ),
Ft(x, a) = c(x, a, νt,1) +
∫
X
Jν∗,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1),
and
Jν
(n)
∗,t (x) = min
a∈A
F
(n)
t (x, a) and J
ν
∗,t(x) = min
a∈A
Ft(x, a).
Observe that the discount factor β is missing in the above equations. For t = T , we
have F
(n)
T (x, a) = c(x, a, ν
(n)
T,1) and FT (x, a) = c(x, a, νT,1). Since c is continuous and
ν
(n)
T,1 weakly converges to νT,1, we have that J
ν
(n)
∗,T continuously converges to J
ν
∗,T by [6,
Proposition 7.32]. But this implies that F
(n)
T−1 continuously converges to FT−1 by the
discussion before Proposition 3.10, and so, Jν
(n)
∗,T−1 continuously converges to J
ν
∗,T−1
again by [6, Proposition 7.32]. Then, by induction hypothesis, we can conclude that
F
(n)
t and J
ν
(n)
∗,t continuously converge to Ft and J
ν
∗,t, respectively, for each t ≤ T .
Therefore, Theorems 3.3 and 4.1 hold for the finite-horizon cost criterion under the
same set of assumptions. Furthermore, if we start the mean-field game at time τ > 0
with initial measure µτ , then the pair
(
{πt}τ≤t≤T , {µt}τ≤t≤T
)
in Theorem 3.3 is still
a mean-field equilibrium for the sub-game. Similar conclusion can be reached for
the finite-agent game problem; that is, the policy {πt}τ≤t≤T is an ε-Markov-Nash
equilibrium for the finite-agent game problem starting at time τ with i.i.d. initial
measures drawn according to µτ .
6. Conclusion. Using the mean-field approach, we have shown that there ex-
ist nearly Markov-Nash equilibria for finite-population game problems with infinite-
horizon discounted costs when the number of agents is sufficiently large. Under mild
technical conditions, we have first established the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in the limiting mean-field game problem. We have then applied this policy to the
finite population game and have demonstrated that it constitutes an ε-Markov-Nash
equilibrium for games with a sufficiently large number of agents.
One interesting future direction is to study mean-field games with imperfect in-
formation. In this case, one possible approach is to use the theory developed for
partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDPs). Finally, average-cost and
risk-sensitive optimality criteria are also worth studying. In particular, using the van-
ishing discount approach in MDP theory (i.e., β → 1), we may be able to establish
similar results for the average cost case.
Appendix.
A. Proof of Theorem 2.3. Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage
cost functions are the same for all agents, it is sufficient to prove the result for Agent 1.
To this end, choose an arbitrary policy pi(N) ⊂ M(N). We prove that for any ε > 0,
there exists π1,ε ∈ Mc1 such that
J
(N)
1 (π
1,ε, π2, . . . , πN ) < J
(N)
1 (π
1, π2, . . . , πN ) + ε,
which will complete the proof.
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To achieve this, we first describe the overall N -agent game as an Markov Deci-
sion Process (MDP) with state space XN × P(X), action space AN , and transition
probability
Q(dy, dµ|x, ν, a) := δFN (y)(dµ)
N∏
i=1
p(dyi|xi, ai, ν),
where FN (y) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 δyi . The one-stage cost function is given by C(x, µ, a) =
c(x1, a1, µ) which corresponds to the one-stage cost function of Agent 1. The cost
function for this MDP is β-discounted cost and denoted by J(π1, . . . , πN ) for the
policy pi(N) = (π1, . . . , πN ). Observe that for any π˜ ∈ M, we have
J(π˜, π2, . . . , πN ) = J
(N)
1 (π˜, π
2, . . . , πN ).
Let (x(t), νt) and a(t) denote the state and action of this MDP at time t, respectively.
Let x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xN (t)).
Recall that µ0 = L(x1(0)). By Lusin’s theorem [14, Theorem 7.5.2], for any
δ0 > 0, there exists a closed set F0 ⊂ X such that µ0(F0) < δ0 and π10 is weakly
continuous on F0. Since P(A) is a convex subset of a locally convex vector space (i.e.,
the set of finite signed measures over A), by Dugundji extension theorem [18, Theorem
7.4] we can extend π10 : F0 → P(A) to X continuously. Let π
1
0,δ denote this extended
continuous function and define π1,1δ := (π
1
0,δ, π
1
1 , π
1
2 , . . .). Then, it is straightforward
to prove that
|J(π1,1δ , π
2, . . . , πN )− J(π1, π2, . . . , πN )|(
= |J
(N)
1 (π
1,1, π2, . . . , πN )− J
(N)
1 (π
1, π2, . . . , πN )|
)
≤ 2L0
∫
F c0
v(x0)µ0(dx0).
Note that the last expression can be made arbitrarily small by choosing arbitrarily
small δ0 since v is µ0-integrable.
We can apply the same method to the policy π1,1δ ; that is, we replace π
1
1 with a con-
tinuous π11,δ that agrees with π
1
1 on some closed subset F1 of X with probability 1−δ1.
Let π1,2δ := (π
1
0,δ, π
1
1,δ, π
1
2 , . . .). Therefore, |J(π
1,2
δ , π
2, . . . , πN )−J(π1,1δ , π
2, . . . , πN )| ≤
2L1
∫
F c1
v(x1)µ1(dx1), where µ1 = L(x1(1)) under π
1,1
δ or π
1,2
δ . Continuing in this way,
we will obtain π1,∞δ ∈ M
c
1 such that
|J(π1, π2, . . . , πN )− J(π1,∞, π2, . . . , πN )|(
= |J
(N)
1 (π
1, π2, . . . , πN )− J
(N)
1 (π
1,∞, π2, . . . , πN )|
)
≤
∞∑
t=0
|J(π1,t, π2, . . . , πN )− J(π1,t+1, π2, . . . , πN )|
≤
∞∑
t=0
2Ltβ
t
∫
F ct
v(xt)µt(dxt).
The last expression goes to zero with the proper choice of the sequence {δt}t≥0. This
completes the proof.
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B. Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let µ ∈M and π ∈ Π be arbitrary. According
to the Ionescu-Tulcea theorem, an initial distribution µ0 on X, a policy π, and state
measure flow µ define a unique probability measure Ppi on G∞ = (X × A)∞. Define
µpit := P
pi(dx(t)) for each t ≥ 0.
Let πˆ be the Markov policy given by
πˆt(da(t)|x(t)) := P
pi(da(t)|x(t)).
We first prove that Ppˆi(dx(t)) =: µpˆit = µ
pi
t for all t. We prove this by induction. For
t = 0 the claim clearly holds as the initial distribution µ0 is fixed. Assume the claim
is true for t ≥ 0. Then we have
µpˆit+1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x(t), a(t), µt)πˆt(da(t)|x(t))µ
pˆi
t (dx(t))
=
∫
X×A
p( · |x(t), a(t), µt)P
pi(da(t)|x(t))µpit (dx(t))
= µpit+1( · ).
This proves the claim.
To complete the proof of the first statement, take any t ≥ 0. Then we have
Epˆi
[
c(x(t), a(t), µpˆit )
]
=
∫
X×A
c(x(t), a(t), µpˆit )πˆ(da(t)|x(t))µ
pˆi
t (dx(t))
=
∫
X×A
c(x(t), a(t), µpit )P
pi(da(t)|x(t))µpit (dx(t))
= Epi
[
c(x(t), a(t), µpit )
]
.
Since t is arbitrary, the above equality holds for all t ≥ 0. Thus, by Tonelli’s theorem
[7, Theorem 18.3], Jµ(πˆ) = Jµ(π).
The proof of the second statement can be done similarly, so we omit the details.
C. Proof of Proposition 3.10. We use successive approximations to prove
Proposition 3.10. To ease the notation, let T (n) := T ν
(n)
, J
(n)
∗ := J
ν
(n)
∗ , T := T
ν , and
J∗ := J
ν
∗ . Let u
(n)
0 = u0 = 0 and
u
(n)
k+1 = T
(n)u
(n)
k and uk+1 = Tuk.
Since T (n) and T are contractive operators on C with modulus σβα, it can be proved
that
ρ(u
(n)
k , J
(n)
∗ ), ρ(uk, J∗) ≤ (σβα)
kL0. (6.1)
Lemma 6.1. For any compact K ⊂ X, we have
lim
n→∞
sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k,t (x)− uk,t(x)∣∣ = 0,
for all k ≥ 0 and t ≥ 0, where u
(n)
k =
(
u
(n)
k,t
)
t≥0
and uk =
(
uk,t
)
t≥0
.
Proof. Fix any compact K ⊂ X. Since u
(n)
0 = u0 = 0, the claim trivially holds for
k = 0 and for all t ≥ 0. Suppose that the claim holds for k and for all t ≥ 0. Then,
consider k + 1 and arbitrary t. For these indices, we have
sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k+1,t(x)− uk+1,t(x)∣∣
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= sup
x∈K
∣∣∣∣mina∈A
[
c(x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 ) + β
∫
X
u
(n)
k,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 )
]
−min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, νt,1) + β
∫
X
uk,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
]∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(x,a)∈K×A
∣∣c(x, a, ν(n)t,1 )− c(x, a, νt,1)∣∣
+ β sup
(x,a)∈K×A
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
u
(n)
k,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 )
−
∫
X
uk,t+1(y)p(dy|x, a, νt,1)
∣∣∣∣.
Note that c(· , · , ν(n)) converges to c(· , · , ν) continuously as n → ∞. Furthermore,
since u
(n)
k,t+1 converges to uk,t+1 continuously (as u
(n)
k,t+1, uk,t+1 are continuous and
u
(n)
k,t+1 uniformly converges to uk,t+1 over compact sets by assumption), u
(n)
k,t+1(y) ≤
Lt+1v(y) for all n ≥ 1, and
∫
X
v(y)p(dy|x(n), a(n), ν
(n)
t,1 ) →
∫
X
v(y)p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
t,1 ) for
any (x(n), a(n)) → (x, a) in X × A, by [37, Theorem 3.3]
∫
X
u
(n)
k,t+1(y)p(dy|· , · , ν
(n)
t,1 )
converges to
∫
X
uk,t+1(y)p(dy|· , · , νt,1) continuously as n → ∞. Since continuous
convergence is equivalent to uniform convergence over compact sets for continuous
functions, the last expression goes to zero as n→∞. This completes the proof.
Using previous lemma, we now complete the proof of Proposition 3.10.
Fix any compact K ⊂ X. For all k ≥ 0, we have
sup
x∈K
∣∣J (n)∗,t (x) − J∗,t(x)|
v(x)
≤ ‖J
(n)
∗,t − u
(n)
k,t ‖v + sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k,t (x)− uk,t(x)∣∣
v(x)
+ ‖uk,t − J∗,t‖v
≤ σtρ(J
(n)
∗ ,u
(n)
k ) + sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k,t (x) − uk,t(x)∣∣
v(x)
+ σtρ(J∗,uk)
≤ 2σt(σβα)kL0 + sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k,t (x)− uk,t(x)∣∣
v(x)
(by (6.1)).
This last expression can be made arbitrary small by first choosing large enough k and
then large enough n. This completes the proof since supx∈K v(x) <∞.
D. Auxiliary Lemma. In this section, we state and prove an auxiliary lemma
which is a generalization of [11, Lemma A.2] to unbounded real-valued functions.
Lemma 6.2. Let P : X → P(X) be a transition probability on X given X. Fix
N ≥ 1 and let y1, . . . , yN ∈ X. Let X1, . . . , XN be independent random variables such
that L(Xi) = P ( · |yi). Let e
(N)
0 ( · ) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 δyi and e
(N)
1 ( · ) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 δXi . Then,
we have
E
[
|e
(N)
1 (g)− e
(N)
0 P (g)|
]2
≤
1
N2
N∑
i=1
(
E[Z2i ] + E[Zi]
2
)
,
where Zi = g(Xi).
Proof. By Jensen’s inequality, we have
E
[
|e
(N)
1 (g)− e
(N)
0 P (g)|
]2
= E
[∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
g(Xi)−
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
X
g(y)P (dy|yi)
∣∣∣∣
]2
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≤ E
[∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
g(Xi)−
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
X
g(y)P (dy|yi)
∣∣∣∣
2]
.
The result follows by expanding and simplifying the term inside the expectation.
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